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AFGHANISTAN:
Prospects for Peace and Democratic
Governance and the War on Terrorism
Muna B. Ndulo
Until the removal of the Taliban regime by coalition forces in 2001, Afghanistan had experienced
23 years of almost continuous conflict. Under the
arrangements agreed upon at a conference held in
Bonn in 2001,1 Afghanistan is now engaged in a
peace process designed to establish a democratic
government. The Bonn Agreement on Provisional
Arrangements (Bonn Agreement) seeks to “establish a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic
and fully representative government.”2 One major
advantage for the peace process is that the people of
Afghanistan are tired of the rule of the gun. They
have welcomed international assistance, and would
like to establish a political system that embraces the
principles of democratic governance enshrined in
the Bonn Agreement. However, as the United
Nations has observed, the consequences of civil war
are still apparent in Afghanistan. Strong factional
interests have attempted to entrench themselves in
the wake of the collapse of the Taliban, and the
creation of an environment where the standards of
freedom and fairness enunciated in the Bonn
Agreement prevail is a major challenge.3
In this article, I examine the prospects and challenges of establishing democracy in Afghanistan. I
do this with the firm belief that a successful peace
process in Afghanistan can make a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism, as well as
the eradication of poverty and inequality in an
important region of the world. This process needs
to be encouraged.
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Background to the
Afghanistan Situation
Despite several attempts by Britain to bring the
country under its influence in the nineteenth century, Afghanistan has, for the most part, been an
independent state.4 For the last 23 years, however,
Afghanistan has experienced almost uninterrupted
war. The Soviet Union intervened in 1980 and
installed Babrak Kamal as the ruler. This was followed by anti-regime resistance by various
mujahedin groups.5 In 1985, the mujahedin
formed an alliance against the Soviet Union in
Pakistan. The alliance, comprised of the United
States, Pakistan, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia,
supplied arms and financial assistance to the
mujahedin. The conflict resulted in the displacement of approximately half the Afghan population,
with many fleeing to neighboring Iran or Pakistan.
In 1988, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, the
United States, and Pakistan signed a peace accord,
and the Soviet Union pulled out its troops. In
1992, the mujahedin triumphed, and the Sovietbacked Najibullah government fell from power.
This, however, did not result in peace, as various rival militias fought each other for control of
Kabul. The mujahedin factions agreed to form a
government with the ethnic Tajik. Burhanuddin
Rabbani was proclaimed president in 1993.
Factional contests continued, and the Pashtundominated Taliban emerged as a major challenge
to the Rabbani government. In 1996, the Taliban
seized control of Kabul. The group introduced a
hard-line version of Islam which banned women
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from work, and introduced Islamic punishments
ment outside of Europe. Allied forces led by the
that included stoning to death and amputations.
United States continue their military campaign to
Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United
find remnants of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in
Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban as the legitithe southeast. In March 2002, the Security Council
mate government of Afghanistan. At the height of
established the United Nations Assistance Mission
their power, the Taliban controlled as much as
to Afghanistan (UNAMA).9 UNAMA’s mandate is
two-thirds of the country. In 1999, the United
to assist the Interim Government of Afghanistan in
States imposed an air embargo and financial sancimplementing the Bonn Agreement.
tions on the country in order to force Afghanistan
to hand over Osama bin Laden, who was wanted
Ethnic Groups and Regional Factors
for trial in connection with the east African bombAffecting the Afghanistan Situation
ings of U.S. embassies. The United Nations
Afghanistan is composed of several ethnic groups.
imposed further sanctions6 in 2001 to force the
The main ones are the Pashtuns, in the south of
Taliban to hand over bin Laden after the terrorist
the country (38%); the Tajiks, in the north (25%);
attacks of September 11. In October 2001, the
the Uzbeks, in the west (10%); and the Hazara, in
United States and Britain launched air strikes
the center (20%). Additional groups include the
against Afghanistan in retaliation for the Taliban’s
Turkmen, the Kuchis, the Baluchis and the
refusal to hand over bin Laden, whom they held
responsible for the attacks. In November 2001, the Aimaks. Each of these ethnic communities is mobilized under the control of warlords. Each warlord
Northern Alliance, a group of anti-Taliban militias
has his contingent of fighters and sources of arms
backed by the United States, seized Kabul and
and funds, including revenues from smuggling,
drove the Taliban out of power. On December 5,
import duties, and drug trafficking. Warlords have
2001, talks brokered by the United Nations led
replaced traditional authorities, and are now well
to the Bonn Agreement, intended to provide
benchmarks for the peace process
pending the re-establishment of
permanent government instituEach warlord has his contingent of fighters
tions. Pashtun royalist Hamid
Karzai was sworn in as head of an of arms and funds, including revenues from
interim government and charged
import duties, and drug trafficking.
with the responsibility of implementing the Bonn Agreement. In
entrenched in local communities. Alliances and
December 2001, the United Nations Security
hostilities between the varying factions are based on
Council authorized deployment of the Internapersonal loyalties, ethnic identities, or political
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul
7
beliefs. Political groups often regard as enemies all
and the surrounding areas.
Until recently, the mandate covered only Kabul. members of a particular clan, or all residents of a
locality affiliated with a rival political group. Their
After much pressure from the interim government
attacks target all members of such groups, whether
and from NGOS operating in Afghanistan, the
or not they are combatants. There are linguistic
United Nations agreed in October 2003 to extend
deployment of the ISAF to areas outside of Kabul.8 and religious differences as well. While 75 percent
of the people are Sunni Muslims, 20 percent are
This was welcome news, as it was seen as the best
Shia Muslims. Others follow the Agha Khan.10
way to fill the security gap in the provinces. In
Linguistic or religious differences in themselves are
August 2003, NATO took control of security in
Kabul. This was NATO’s first operational commit- not problematic; they are problematic only when
they are politicized, as they are in Afghanistan.
Fall/Winter 2003

and sources
smuggling,
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The warlords maintain control of their communities by a combination of intimidation and
protection. Warlords have guarded their autonomy
while demanding a fair share of central authority’s
jobs and financial resources. The elimination of the
Taliban and the weakness of central government
have created a power vacuum that the warlords
have filled. In failed states, where governments
cannot exercise authority, warlords emerge to fill
the power vacuum, and individuals tend to fall
back on their own ethnic or religious communities
for security. Another complication in Afghanistan
is the influence of outsiders who have attempted to
promote their own interests by manipulating vulnerable fellow ethnicities within the country.
Pakistan, for example, tries to counter Pashtun
nationalism by cultivating Islamic militancy among
its Pashtun neighbors through ideological and
military support for the Taliban movement. Pakistan assisted the Saudi regime in spreading the
Wahhabi version of fundamentalist Islam. It financed and provided instructors for schools that
trained the Taliban cadres. Iran is likewise committed to protecting Afghanistan’s Shia minorities,
which is the reason for Iran’s hostilities toward the
Taliban during their reign.
The Afghan economy has been shattered by war,
further limiting the government’s ability to govern
effectively. The Central Bank of Afghanistan forecasts the 2003 GDP at about $5 billion; with a
population of 22 million, income per capita is a
mere $225. The whole country in August 3003 had
no commercial banks. War has devastated the
infrastructure. An estimated 5 million people are
displaced. Afghanistan also faces severe health
issues. A UNICEF report found that one in four
Afghan children dies before the age of five, most
from hygiene-preventable waterborne illnesses like
diarrhea, acute respiratory problems, malnutrition,
and vaccine-preventable illnesses.11 Since the Afghan government lacks money, the international
community will have to finance its reconstruction.
Thus far, most of the financial pledges made to
Afghanistan have not materialized. Compared to
12

An Afghan family’s makeshift living quarters in the foreground
other post-conflict situations in Bosnia, Kosovo,
East Timor, and Rwanda, Afghanistan receives
much less in aid per capita.12 The warlords were
involved in the Bonn negotiations and are signatories to the Bonn Agreement. Their involvement
has had its own costs in the peace process, as it has
tended to provide them with some legitimacy.
Their hold on power, however, can be changed
once communities have an alternative source of
security.

The Bonn Agreement as the
Foundation of the Peace Process
The Bonn Agreement established the Interim
Government on December 22, 2001 through an
Emergency Loya Jirga (a traditional Afghan traditional consultative assembly). The Government
was to be a broad-based administration formed to
lead Afghanistan until a fully representative government is elected through free and fair elections
to be held in June 2004. The Interim Government
is charged with drafting a new constitution and
rebuilding the judicial system. The Interim Administration is to establish a judicial commission
to rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international
standards, the rule of law and Afghanistan legal
traditions; a Central Bank; an independent civil
service commission; and an independent human
rights commission. All of the talks are to be carried
out with the assistance of the United Nations.
The Bonn Agreement provides that the judicial
power of Afghanistan shall be independent and
Cornell Law Forum

shall be vested in a Supreme
Afghans constantly identify disarmament, demobilization
Court of Afghanistan, and other
and reintegration of armed groups as the single greatest
such courts as the Interim Government establishes. One of the
precondition for the establishment of durable peace.
weaknesses of the Bonn Agreement is that it focuses on
building state institutions which are typically eliteand be reorganized according to the requirements
based, and does not provide a parallel mechanism
of the new Afghan security and armed forces.” 15
for settling local conflicts and political disputes in
Afghans constantly identify disarmament, demobithe peace process. Other peace processes have made lization and reintegration of armed groups as the
the same mistake. The exception was South Africa,
single greatest precondition for the establishment
where, parallel to the development of national
of durable peace. But little has been achieved in the
institutions, a process known as the peace accord
disarmament process. In the provinces, commandwas established.13 This involved setting up peace
ers with little or no popular legitimacy remain the
committees in every community in the country. In
principle military partners of the coalition forces,
these committees, various communities met to
and have used their power to consolidate control
resolve conflict at the community level, and to
over regional administrations and economies. Colwork together on development and reconstruction
laboration with local commanders has drawn the
in their communities. This process sought to comcoalition forces into their local factional and perbine two of the most important aspects of conflict
sonal rivalries, compromising what is supposed to
resolution. It secured parties’ endorsement of, and
be the forces’ non-partisanship in disputes unrecommitment to, important and relevant common
lated to the war on terrorism.16
values. These values provided a transcendent referThe United Nations has repeatedly postponed
the start of the demobilization program. In late
ence point for the settlement of future disputes,
and comprised at least part of the foundation of a
October 2003, the United Nations initiated the
Afghanistan New Beginnings Program, intended to
future national political culture in a democratic
state. The culture and habit of democratic selfremove the support structure beneath senior commanders by disengaging lower-level commanders
governance, regard for human rights and
and troops through individualized counseling,
obligations, cooperative governance, and multivocational training, jobs creation and placement.
cultural tolerance and harmony, all need to be
developed in order to ensure enduring peace in a
The New Beginnings Program requires combatants
post-conflict state.
from different political factions to give up their
weapons to the central government under the auThe Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General noted, “The furthering of the political thority of the Ministry of Defense. The program,
process, together with reconstruction programs, the however, was negotiated in the absence of either an
improvement in the human rights situation,
international or a non-factional Afghan force that
counter-narcotics programs, and other aspects of
can project its authority throughout the country.17
As a result, the Tajik commanders dominating the
the Bonn process, all depend to a great extent on
Ministry of Defense have emerged as key players in
the security situation.” 14 A key element of the
Bonn Agreement is disarmament. The relevant
the demobilization process. Therefore there is a
provision states: “Upon the official transfer of
serious risk that powerful figures will misuse the
power, all mujahedin, Afghan armed forces and
program to strengthen patronage networks or to
armed groups in the country shall come under the
demobilize their opponents. It is unlikely that an
command and control of the Interim Authority,
armed group would trust its safety to a government
institution it views as representing factional rather
Fall/Winter 2003
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than national interests. This leads to the conclusion
that there is urgent need to reform the Ministry of
Defense. Reform has an important economic prerequisite. The international community needs to
support demobilization by creating sustainable
employment opportunities for the demobilized
troops.
The Bonn Agreement requests the United Nations to organize elections for June 2004, and to
ensure that they are free and fair. The elections are
seen not only as part of the democratic process, but
also as a conflict resolution mechanism to resolve
the question of who among various political parties
will govern Afghanistan. Conducting national
elections is a huge political undertaking. The June
2004 date allows for very little time to consider the
specific cultural issues that affect Afghan society,
and the political and security environment complicates the process. At present, too many areas are
inaccessible for lack of security. Voter registration
must include the nomads and returning refugees.
In addition, a decision must be made about the
large numbers of refugees still in Pakistan and Iran.
There is also the problem of well-funded religious parties competing with the new,
poorly-funded democratic parties. The international community must find a way to fund the
secular parties if they are to match the strength of
the religious parties that foreign governments with
religious agendas often fund. An important measure of the validity of an electoral process is the
extent to which the community where the election
is held accepts its legitimacy. Acceptance flows to a
large extent from the transparency with which the
process is pursued. Mechanisms for enhancing
transparency include providing an appropriate role
for the media, political parties, candidates, and
other elements of civil society, and implementing
an effective voter education program. The latter is
especially important in a country where the literacy
rate is low, respect for human rights is dismal, and
the electorate has not been exposed to regular elections.
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In a post-conflict election, such as the proposed
June 2004 Afghanistan election, the electoral process must address both security and violence
concerns, and the participation of marginalized
groups. The election process should be administered in an environment free from violence,
intimidation and retribution. The state must take
all necessary steps to ensure that all adult citizens
qualify to vote, register, and exercise the right to
vote. Measures in Afghanistan need to be taken to
improve the security situation, and to ensure that
women are able to exercise their right to register
and to vote.
The human rights situation in Afghanistan
remains a matter of serious concern. Throughout
the country, the absence of the rule of law facilitates the abuse of power, most often by local
commanders and factional forces, and creates an
environment where illegal taxation, extortion,
forced displacement, kidnappings, rape, arbitrary
detention, and other human rights violations are
routine.18 The Afghan courts lack legitimacy, as
people perceive the judicial system as unable to
properly serve the interests of the people.19 In a
country where the rule of the gun has been the
dominant feature for well over two decades, the
justice sector has probably suffered more damage
than any other part of the state structure. Many of
the judges lack the necessary qualifications. The
courts—where they exist—are fragile and lack
basic facilities. In several provinces, warlords have
assumed judicial functions. In some other provinces, Islamic clergy or local Shuras (councils of
elders) assume judicial functions. In many of these
provinces, trials which fall far short of internationally accepted standards of fairness have reportedly
resulted in sentences such as stoning to death and
public lashings.20
Without adequately resourced and professionally trained judicial and law enforcement
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institutions, victims have no legal recourse, and
perpetrators act with impunity. The establishment
of the rule of law in Afghanistan is essential to the
peace process. Without the reform of institutions
of justice, the legal framework that underpins the
peaceful resolution of disputes will not take root.
Impunity for armed law-breakers will persist, and
citizens will be deprived of justice. Legitimate
economic activity is unprotected, and local and
international investors worry about entering the
market. In the context of Afghanistan’s fragile
transition to peace, judicial reform is inseparable
from security, and thus from commensurable reform of the military, police, and institutions of
correction.

Challenges to Implementing
the Bonn Agreement

enues would enable the government to address
financial shortfalls, provide critically needed finances for central institutions, and gradually
increase the self-sufficiency and capacity of the
central government.
The other challenge facing Afghanistan is the
development of constitutional arrangements to set
up viable institutions within which to conduct
governance. These institutions must foster an environment where peace and development can
flourish, and ensure the promotion and protection
of human rights for all Afghans, irrespective of
gender, race or tribe. The constitution-making
process is being carried out under the auspices of a
Constitutional Commission with technical support
from UNAMA and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Adopting a new Afghan
constitution raises debates on many issues: What
will be the place of Islam in the country? What
type of political system will be adopted? Will Afghanistan be a federal or national State? The place
of Islam needs to be addressed and should not be
left vague. The role of Islam in Afghan society and
its relationship to the constitution will be the critical factor that determines the observance of human
rights in Afghanistan. Attempts to fudge the issue
are likely to be at the expense of the promotion
and protection of human rights—especially
women’s rights.
The legitimacy of the constitution which the
Constitutional Commission is developing is a criti-

Reestablishing the rule of law and an effective
government are essential prerequisites for democracy and stability in Afghanistan. At the moment,
the Karzai government remains weak and completely dependent on donor support for its
financial resources. For example, in an effort to
exert greater authority over the provinces, President
Hamid Karzai summoned ten of the country’s
provincial governors and two regional commanders
to Kabul during May 2003, and demanded their
compliance with a 13-point decision of the National Security Council. The decision banned
recruitment of private military
personnel, forbade unauthorized
The establishment of the rule of law in Afghanistan
military action, reaffirmed the
regulation that no individual can
is essential to the peace process.
hold both a military and a civilian post, and dissolved
extra-governmental bodies and titles along with all
cal matter. Questions raised about the process
of their administrative and executive powers.
relate to the openness of the process, a perception
To date, the extent of compliance and the govthat the religious leaders are dominating the proernment’s capacity to enforce the decision remains
cess, and a lack of civic education as to what the
to be seen.21 One area of weakness undermining
process is about.22 Civic education can empower
the central government is its inability to collect
citizens to curtail the role of the warlords. Constiprovincial revenues. Collection of provincial revtutional drafting experience suggests that not only
is the content of a constitution important, but also
Fall/Winter 2003
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how, by whom, and in what historical context the
constitution is drafted and implemented. The new
constitution should steer Afghanistan into a functioning and inclusive nationhood in which most
people feel they are citizens regardless of their
ethnicity or religion. It should be a liberating document that empowers all Afghans and enables them
to participate in the economic development of the
country. Only then will the people of Afghanistan
collectively have a vested interest in normality and
in improving the conditions of society.
One factor that may prove to be an obstacle to
enduring peace in Afghanistan is the growing perception of many ethnic Pashtuns that they lack
meaningful representation in the central government, particularly in its security institutions.23
Although a Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, heads the
Interim Administration, a Tajik armed faction
dominates the administration. For example, the
Tajiks control the Foreign Affairs Department, the
Defense Department, and the Department of the
Interior.
President Karzai is widely seen as unable to limit
either the power of the Tajiks within Kabul, or of
the commanders—irrespective of their ethnicity—
who wield power in other parts of the country.
Pashtun alienation is compounded by the displacement of large numbers of Pashtuns in the North.
These Pashtuns, following the collapse of the
Taliban regime, became the targets of violent attacks by factions of the United Front, a group that
helped the United States led coalition forces defeat
the Taliban. Risks posed by the growing disaffection among Pashtuns in Afghanistan should be
self-evident.
The Taliban came to power not only because of
the military assistance provided by Pakistan, but
also because local commanders had become notorious for the abuse of civilians and the extortion of
money from traders. For the state to be effective, it
is necessary for those over whom it claims authority
to see it as legitimate and as deserving of their
respect and obedience. In the Afghan context, the
critical test for legitimacy is going to be whether or
16

not the country’s component ethnic
communities are equally represented in the main organs of state:
the courts, the legislature, the military, and the executive.

The Peace Process
and Women’s Rights
Woman’s rights are a major concern
in Afghanistan. The lives of hundreds of thousands of women and
children have been shattered in the
human rights catastrophe that has
devastated Afghanistan for the past
23 years.24 Armed groups have
massacred defenseless women in
their homes, or have brutally beaten and raped
them. Alongside these appalling abuses, women
have been prevented from exercising several of
their fundamental rights, including the rights of
association, freedom of expression and employment. The mujahedin groups perceive such
activities to be un-Islamic for women. Many parts
of the country have a strong emphasis on prosecuting women and girls for adultery, for running
away from home, and for engaging in consensual
sex before marriage. In some parts of the country,
women are subjected to virginity tests, the failure
of which leads to a presumption of violating the
prohibition of sex outside of marriage. Women
still wear the heavily veiled burqa, which the
mullahs prescribe to follow the Qur’an’s injunction to dress moderately. Gross human rights
violations against women have been committed
with total impunity.
It is important to realize that while the violation of women’s rights in Afghanistan was worse
under the Taliban, it did not begin with them. It is
rooted in the deeply conservative traditions prevalent in Afghan society. For example, the Supreme
Court of the Islamic State of Afghanistan was
reported in 1994 to have issued an Ordinance on
Women’s Veils, which ordained that women must
wear a veil that covers the whole body. The Ordi-
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nance forbade women from leaving their homes or
from being looked at.
One of the most important challenges facing the
Afghanistan peace process is how to ensure the
participation of women in the political and economic system, given the historical treatment of
women in the country. This will involve providing
women with alternative means of survival to obviate the need to rely on men to function in Afghan
society. This will also involve encouraging a more
liberal interpretation of Islam. In Afghanistan, as in
most Islamic countries, mullahs are highly respected community leaders with great power over
social and political affairs. In Afghanistan, where
the majority of the population is illiterate, and
villages are isolated from the outside world,
mullahs are often the only source of information.
The real challenge in the coming months is
going to be registering women voters, especially in
the south and west, where conservative views about
taking pictures of women are still strong, and
women face danger if they decide to participate in
the political process.25 In order to make any meaningful progress in the protection of women’s rights,
any future Afghan government needs to publicly
commit itself to women’s rights; to abolish all
legislation that treats women and men unequally,
or condones human rights violations; to recognize
that discrimination in law and practice against
women and girl children is a key contributory
factor to human rights abuses such as torture, including rape and other forms of sexual violence;
and to initiate a plan of action against such discrimination.

The Role of the International
Community in the Peace Process
The international effort should focus on building
effective governance institutions and providing the
necessary financial resources for this effort. Without a viable state apparatus, there can be no
development or observance of human rights. At
this stage of reconstruction in Afghanistan, it is
Fall/Winter 2003

critical that development activities measurably
improve people’s lives and reinforce the central
government’s legitimacy.
Funds for commissions and the national election mandated by the Bonn Agreement, as well as
for mine clearance, security reform, disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration, are budgetary
items that must be fully supported if the political
process is to move ahead. In particular, financial
assistance for training the police and a national
army are critical to establish security and to create a
solid foundation for a democratic state.
The domination of the Afghanistan political
landscape by armed groups and individual commanders is still the principal obstacle to the
implementation of the Bonn Agreement.26 Without
a credible process for disarming, demobilizing and
reintegrating former commanders and fighters into
society, it is inconceivable that Afghanistan can
meaningfully implement any of the key elements of
the peace process, including the adoption of a new
constitution, judicial reform, or elections.
In any democracy, a key indicator of effective
authority is the monopoly over security held by the
armed forces, and the elimination of armed militias
and private armies. This is sometimes achieved by
incorporating personnel from private armies into
the national militia. Warlords will change once the
rules of the game change. Alfonso Dhlakam, the
leader of the Mozambican rebel group RENAMO,
was known as one of the most brutal warlords in
the world. Once the civil war ended in 1993 and
successful disarmament was carried out, he became
a member of Parliament in Mozambique and has
since 1994 been playing parliamentary politics and
engaging in business. When resistance is no longer
feasible, most warlords will not fade away; they
will apply their skills and contacts to meet the
requirements of the new political system. The
phenomenon of warlords should be seen as a political question intimately tied to security. Though
warlords have a military character, they are essentially “politicians” attempting to perpetuate their
own political power in the existing political system.
Their resistance to disarmament is a political deci17

sion. They intend to prevent the establishment of
an alternative political system, which they view as
displacing their own power.
The peace process in Afghanistan will be long,
and the international community must be prepared
for a long-term commitment. There can be no
quick fixes. The transition from authoritarianism
or conflict to democratic rule requires determined
long-term efforts. The enormity of the challenge
should not be underestimated. But concerted efforts to overcome the obstacles could firmly place
Afghanistan on the road to democracy and development. The war on terrorism is not going to be
won through armed conflict alone. It will be more
effectively won through economic development.
People need a stake in the world to defend its values. Also, the huge military expenditures necessary
for military operations can only be reduced by the
development of civil institutions that when effective, make military operations unnecessary and
redundant.
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